[1]俞雪莲、黄茂兴.创新政策组合对企业创新绩效影响的实证研究——基于高管激励的调节效应[J].福建工程学院学报,2021,19(01):43-50.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2021.01.008]
　YU Xuelian,HUANG Maoxing.An empirical study on the impact of innovation policy portfolio on innovation performance of enterprises:regulatory effects based on executive incentives[J].Journal of FuJian University of Technology,2021,19(01):43-50.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2021.01.008]
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创新政策组合对企业创新绩效影响的实证研究——基于高管激励的调节效应()
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《福建工程学院学报》[ISSN:2097-3853/CN:35-1351/Z]

卷:
第19卷
期数:
2021年01期
页码:
43-50
栏目:
出版日期:
2021-02-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
An empirical study on the impact of innovation policy portfolio on innovation performance of enterprises:regulatory effects based on executive incentives
作者:
俞雪莲、黄茂兴
福建工程学院管理学院
Author(s):
YU Xuelian;  HUANG Maoxing
School of Economics,Fujian Normal University
关键词:
创新政策组合; 企业创新绩效; 高管激励
Keywords:
innovation policy portfolio;  enterprise innovation performance;  executive incentives
分类号:
F270
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2021.01.008
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
采用2011—2018年沪深A股高新技术上市公司数据，探讨创新政策组合、高管激励机制对企业创新绩效的内在作用机理。研究发现，创新政策组合能够显著提高企业创新绩效；高管薪酬激励具有正向调节作用，特别是能增强政策组合对高技术创新绩效的影响效果。企业产权性质不同，高管激励的调节作用也存在差异:相较于国有企业，非国有企业高管薪酬激励的调节作用更加明显；高管持股产生的调节作用较弱，只有非国有企业的高管持股才能产生正向调节作用。
Abstract:
Based on the data of high-tech companies listed on the A-share market in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2018, the internal mechanism of innovation policy portfolio and executive incentive mechanism on enterprise innovation performance were discussed. Results show that the innovation policy portfolio can significantly improve the innovation performance of enterprises; executive compensation incentive has a positive moderating effect on them, and it can especially enhance the effect of the portfolio on high-tech innovation performances. At the same time, the moderating effect of executive incentives varies with different property rights: compared with state-owned enterprises, the moderating effect of executive compensation incentive in non-state-owned enterprises is more obvious; the moderating effect of executive stock ownership is weak, and only the executive stock ownership in non-state-owned enterprises can have a positive moderating effect.

参考文献/References:

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更新日期/Last Update: 2021-02-25