[1]张庭溢.碳排放权配额统一增价拍卖均衡下企业减排研究[J].福建工程学院学报,2018,16(03):293-300.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2018.03.017]
　ZHANG Tingyi.Study on carbon emission reduction of two homogeneous enterprises under the equalization of carbon emission quota with unified auction[J].Journal of FuJian University of Technology,2018,16(03):293-300.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2018.03.017]
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碳排放权配额统一增价拍卖均衡下企业减排研究()
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《福建工程学院学报》[ISSN:2097-3853/CN:35-1351/Z]

卷:
第16卷
期数:
2018年03期
页码:
293-300
栏目:
出版日期:
2018-06-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Study on carbon emission reduction of two homogeneous enterprises under the equalization of carbon emission quota with unified auction
作者:
张庭溢
福建工程学院交通运输学院
Author(s):
ZHANG Tingyi
School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology
关键词:
碳排放权配额拍卖;  独立需求;  古诺竞争;  减排;  统一增价拍卖
Keywords:
carbon emission quota auction;  independent demand;  Cournot competition;  carbon emission reduction;  unified auction
分类号:
F062.2； F224.3； F253.1
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1672-4348.2018.03.017
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
由于碳排放权资源的稀缺性，过高的碳排放权拍卖价格将极大地增加企业的生产运营成本，从而迫使企业考虑投资以降低碳排放成本。针对低碳产品敏感的消费者建立产销模型，由竞拍企业的碳排放权需求函数在统一增价拍卖中形成拍卖均衡，以企业自身收益最大化为决策标准，给出最优减排决策。结论表明：碳排放总量的大小直接决定了拍卖均衡价格的高低，碳排放权拍卖总量的控制是经济结构调整的一个有效措施。
Abstract:
Due to the scarcity of carbon emission quota, its excessive auction price will greatly increase the cost of production and operation, thus forcing enterprises to consider investing to reduce the cost of carbon emissions. A production and marketing model was established for consumers who are sensitive to low-carbon products. Auction equilibrium was realized in unified auction with the working of the carbon emission demand function of the enterprises. Maximization of their profits was the standard in their decision-making when making the optimal decision in reducing emission. Results show that the total amount of carbon emissions directly determines the auction equilibrium price. The control of the total amount of carbon emission qumakingota auction is an effective measure in economic restructuring.

参考文献/References:

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更新日期/Last Update: 2018-06-25