[1]卢桐百,高良鹏,胡永仕,等.基于演化博弈的预约停车策略分析[J].福建理工大学学报,2024,22(06):605-612.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.06.014]
　LU Tongbai,GAO Liangpeng,HU Yongshi,et al.Analysis of reservation parking strategy based on evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Fujian University of Technology;,2024,22(06):605-612.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.06.014]
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基于演化博弈的预约停车策略分析
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《福建理工大学学报》[ISSN:2097-3853/CN:35-1351/Z]

卷:
第22卷
期数:
2024年06期
页码:
605-612
栏目:
出版日期:
2024-12-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis of reservation parking strategy based on evolutionary game theory
作者:
卢桐百; 高良鹏; 胡永仕; 简文良; 曾丽华
福建理工大学交通运输学院
Author(s):
LU Tongbai; GAO Liangpeng;  HU Yongshi;  JIAN Wenliang;  ZENG Lihua
School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology
关键词:
演化博弈; 预约停车; 政策激励; 停车模式
Keywords:
evolutionary game; reservation parking; policy incentives; parking mode
分类号:
U491
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.06.014
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
针对停车供需矛盾失衡、预约停车模式发展缓慢等问题，应用演化博弈理论探究预约停车模式中驾驶人、停车平台和管理部门之间的互动关系，建立了三方演化博弈模型，解析停车行为中各参与方决策行为的演化稳定性，模拟不同收益水平对各方演化博弈行为的影响。研究结果表明，驾驶人、停车平台和管理部门的决策行为演化速率和演化波动性受各自收益制约并产生相互影响；其中，管理部门所采取的激励策略对预约停车发展起明显的促进作用，而停车平台对管理部门激励力度的响应程度会高于驾驶人群体；当停车平台能够提供较为稳定的停车预约服务时，管理部门可逐渐实行激励退坡，而较不会影响到驾驶人能享受的预约停车便利性。
Abstract:
In response to the imbalance between parking supply and demand and the slow development of the reservation parking mode, the evolutionary game theory was applied to explore the interaction between drivers, parking platforms, and management departments in the reservation parking mode. A tripartite evolutionary game model was established to analyze the evolutionary stability of the decision-making behavior among all parties involved in parking behavior, and to simulate the impact of different income levels on the evolutionary game behavior of all parties involved. Research results indicate that the evolution rate and volatility of decision-making behaviors of drivers, parking platforms, and management departments are constrained by their respective benefits and interact with one another. Among them, the incentive strategies adopted by the management department have a significant promoting effect on the development of reserved parking, and the response of parking platforms to the incentive efforts of the management department will be higher than that of the driver group. When the parking platform can provide a relatively stable parking reservation service, the management department can gradually implement incentives to retreat without affecting the convenience of reservation parking that drivers can enjoy.

参考文献/References:

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更新日期/Last Update: 2024-12-25