[1]陈兆芳,葛雪慧,黄文翰.风险偏好视角下塔式起重机施工安全监管演化博弈分析[J].福建理工大学学报,2024,22(03):233-242.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.03.005]
　CHEN Zhaofang,GE Xuehui,HUANG Wenhan.Evolutionary game analysis of tower crane construction safety supervision from the perspective of risk preference[J].Journal of Fujian University of Technology;,2024,22(03):233-242.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.03.005]
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风险偏好视角下塔式起重机施工安全监管演化博弈分析
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《福建理工大学学报》[ISSN:2097-3853/CN:35-1351/Z]

卷:
第22卷
期数:
2024年03期
页码:
233-242
栏目:
出版日期:
2024-06-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game analysis of tower crane construction safety supervision from the perspective of risk preference
作者:
陈兆芳; 葛雪慧; 黄文翰
福建理工大学管理学院
Author(s):
CHEN Zhaofang;  GE Xuehui;  HUANG Wenhan
School of Management, Fujian University of Technology
关键词:
塔式起重机; 风险偏好; 演化博弈
Keywords:
tower cranes;  accident preferences;  evolutionary games
分类号:
F224.32
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.2097-3853.2024.03.005
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为有效提高塔式起重机施工安全监管效果,减少事故发生,在引入风险偏好系数描述决策主体对风险感知程度的基础上,构建了塔式起重机安全监管三方演化博弈模型,并分析其稳定策略。结果表明:政府监管部门松弛管理会加大安全事故发生的概率;第三方检测机构和塔式起重机用户的风险感知程度对策略演化结果有着关键影响作用。此外,安全管理成本、事故惩罚力度和安全行为收益也会影响主体的策略选择。提高主体对安全事故的风险意识,可以有效地减少安全事故的发生。
Abstract:
In order to effectively improve the effect of tower crane construction safety supervision and reduce the occurrence of accidents, based on the introduction of risk preference coefficient describing the different degree of risk perception of the decision-making subject, a tripartite evolution game model of tower crane safety supervision is constructed and its stabilization strategy is analyzed. Results show that: slack management by government regulators will increase the probability of safety accidents; the risk perception degree of third-party testing institutions and tower crane users has a key influence on strategy evolution results. In addition, the cost of safety management, the intensity of accident penalties and the benefits of safety actions also affect the subjects strategy choice. Improving the subjects risk awareness of safety accidents can effectively reduce the occurrence of accidents.

参考文献/References:

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更新日期/Last Update: 2024-06-25